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The Dramatic and Mimetic Features of the Gorgias of Plato.—

by

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[illegible] Notes

1. The proportion of participation is (exclud-[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]) for Socrates, [illegible]; Callicles, [illegible]; Polus, 4%; Gorgias, 3 4/10 %; Chaerephon 1/8%.

2. For the genuine dialogues, to Teuffel's list were added Io, Menexenus and Parmenides.

3. For the Socratic dialogues, including [illegible] [illegible]

Introduction.

The great mimetic and dramatic powers of Plato [illegible] Dionysius of [illegible] (ad Pomp.) [illegible] μιμεῖται τοὺς πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ — Γοργίαν καὶ Πῶλον κτλ, and elsewhere alludes (Art. X.2, XI.6) to his skill in ἠθοποιία, while Basilius Magnus*, citing three [illegible] [illegible] with the remark, οἱ φιλόσοφοι — εἰσάγουσι πρόσωπα διαλεγόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν [illegible] χαρακτηρίζουσιν, and adds that Socrates strengthens (κρατύνει) the speech of Callicles [illegible] known from the [illegible] authority that Plato was a close student of the mimes of Sophron and of Aristophanes, to whose influence were due the mimetic features of his dialogues. [illegible]

* [illegible]

Thrasyllus, and into trilogies by Aristophanes of Byzantium, also bears witness to the general feeling. Modern criticism has more than confirmed the judgment of antiquity. We admire the solemn tragedy of the Phaedo as well as the bright comedy of the Protagoras, while the graceful introduction to the Phaedrus, the rhetorical parody of the Menexenus, and the wonderful microcosm of the Symposium all show the touch of a master hand. Indeed, [illegible] dialogues do we wholly miss the dramatic coloring, which adorns alike his [illegible] [illegible] Heraclides that while others wrote Socratic dialogues, Plato alone composed mimes.

The dramatic and mimetic art of Plato

has been quite fully treated by von Stein, and Teine has done some clever work in this field, [illegible] [illegible] Judgment, [illegible] to its more apparent manifestations. The meaning of the Symposium has been discussed by Professor Gildersleeve(?) and others, and judging from the title, "Charakterbilder aus Protagoras", a certain Mayr of Komotau has devoted a program to similar study in that dialogue. [illegible] the [illegible]*, the Republic, with their wealth of finely drawn characters [illegible] investigation, and the more juvenile interludes Lysis, Laches, Charmides, would not be without interest. Dramatic analyses of the Phaedo by Suckow and of the Republic by Bacher(?) [illegible]

* [illegible]

serve mention. Whether the purpose of dramatic [illegible] en-
forcement of argument and the enforcing of
principles [illegible] of litera-
ture than to the philosopher. We must bear
in mind that the dialogue, even when most
artistic, is only analogous to the drama,
and in many matters of detail the resem-
blance is often partial or faint. It must
be remembered, moreover, that these are com-
posed, not presented [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
nature of Platonic μίμησις. His own princi-
ple is stated in the Republic (396e), σμικρόν
τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως [illegible]
[illegible]

ὅτι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν (Lc. 22). The characters are generally few, in accordance with antique precedent, and their delineation is not allowed to distract attention from the purpose of the [illegible] types [illegible] of intellectual and moral tendencies, and so the lines are drawn more sharply than for the mere individual. For the same reason, only certain [illegible] emphasized, and the result is often more or less one-sided. Professor Gildersleeve has noticed that, when the space is limited, the portraiture is coarser and more exaggerated and so Prodicus and Thrasymachus stand in bolder relief than Protagoras and Gorgias. "Simplicity and intensity" is the verdict of von Stein, and this fresh and delicate delineation would alone justify his title of "Homer of philosophers". Well does Hensde say, "risum nobis excitat Lucianus,

ludicrous atque Aristophanes: in Platone legenda-vidimus. In a word, where the quality is fine, the quantity is small. One drop of the honey of Hymettus, one note from Apollo's swan, may fitly shed their sweetness over an entire life.

In the Gorgias the earnestness of thought and intensity of feeling exclude the brilliant decoration of the Protagoras; yet the art of the master is far from lacking. No Platonic dialogue, says Steinhart, so closely resembles a tragedy in its lofty pathos of language and in its basic thought — Man's presumption opposed to God's eternal law. The allusions to the approaching death of [illegible] (486 [illegible], 521, 522), and to the [illegible] of his life (486 B), are like the expressions of double meaning, which so

often foreshadow the catastrophe of a Greek tragedy, and of which the Oedipus Tyrannus affords the best example. These premonitions [illegible] form (521E), when Socrates parodies his own trial by the instance of a physician [illegible] court of boys. The abundant irony and [illegible] moron are also characteristic of tragic diction. Köchly has drawn a striking parallel between the Antigone and the life of Socrates, and thus we see that Plato had before him a tragic life to inspire his drama.

Moreover, it has been shown that the dia- [illegible] the five acts of a tragedy. They are I) the πρόλογος (chap. 1-15), II) the first episode, or πρότασις (16-36), III) the second episode or ἐπίτασις (37-51),

(11) the third episode or μετάβασις (55-78), and the ἔξοδος (79-83). The first and second episodes are suitably marked by the entrance of a new character, and the third by the partial retirement of x the second actor. The only vestiges of the stasima are the summaries of the argument made by Socrates at the close of each episode (480 E f., 500 A-D, 522 B-E). [illegible]. The parodos is still less apparent. A faint trace may be found in the intermezzo of chap. XIII, where serious and positive discussion is really introduced for the first time. The [illegible] the sophistic position, the internal principles, as the short prooemium (chap. I) presents the characters and scenery, the external features of the drama. The progress of argument follows the lines of development of a tragic

plot, so that in the last act all the previous [illegible] mony. Here too the gods appear upon the scene, like so many dei ex machina, and the myth, in its function of exodus, as in the Republic, "points the moral" as well as "adorns the tale." [illegible] pieces, sums up the whole thought of the drama, and closes with a personal exhortation. The chorus, as an integral part of the action, steadily decreased, and in Euripides and the latest works of Aristophanes [illegible] space.* Here it is only represented by the silent audience, to whom allusion is often made [illegible] of interest are indicated by θόρυβος (455θ). Dicaeopolis is evidently its coryphaeus. He assumes its mediating functions, evinces its

* v. Haigh. The Attic Theatre, pp. 259-261.

[illegible]
fondness for the wise saw and trite maxim,
but he lacks the lyric beauty of their speech.
[illegible]
he is on the side of the protagonist, who
is, as in all but the latest dialogues, Soc-
rates himself. Callicles is the antago-
nist, while Gorgias and Polus, who repre-
sent one and the same stage of the discus-
sion, together assume the rôle of the third
actor. The dramatic unities of time and
place are maintained throughout.

We may note the artistic placing of the
first word, πολέμου, which indicates the
nature of the dialogue, and the pathetic
position of the last word, Καλλίκλεις, which
is quite consistent with the prominent
part that he plays.* It is well to notice
that tragedy, not comedy, was Plato's model

* [illegible]
Aesch. Pers. (init.): stelle. Dante, Inf. Purg. Par. (fin.) –

in economy. Act III is like the comic agon mainly in being the crisis of the whole action. The Gorgias does not lend itself very readily to a comparison with the Pindaric ode.* The [illegible] [illegible] Plato as well as in Pindar.** The myth here, moreover, is at the close, not in the centre. However, in a general way, Acts I and II, which are preparatory, may stand for the ἀρχά, and Acts IV and V [illegible] (σφραγίς) upon the results obtained. The third act, which enunciates the position of Callicles, [illegible] [illegible] likeness to the ὀμφαλός.

In regard to the mimetic features of our dialogue, Bénard remarks that the persons are "avec précision caractérisé, chacun a son

* [illegible] **[illegible]

language, sa manière d'agir.– To demonstrate the validity of this claim and to examine the phenomena upon which it is based, the investigation embodied in this essay has been made. If it has contributed, however slightly, to a clearer insight into the art of Plato, it has fully achieved its purpose.

Gorgias.

Gorgias, [illegible]
with the study of Homer. He puts Homer
[illegible]
of philosophy, i.e. the suitors of Penelope. Moreover, he wrote encomia of Achilles and Helen, and a defence of Palamedes. Very appropriately, then, almost his first words are ὅγε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος (449A), a phrase which occurs some twenty times in the great epics. Then, too, his εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς (463A) [illegible] νος μειλίσσεο (γ, 96). In 450B, we meet with two words, which Olympiodorus tells us are Sicilian ([illegible] λέξεις ἐγχωρίους εἰδότας), while he notes that Isocrates uses κῦρος. χειρούργημα occurs only here, and κύρωσις elsewhere only in Thucydides and Josephus. The former may

[illegible],
and Josephus from the present passage. This
seems to be the only place in this dialogue,
where the local peculiarities of the speakers
are reproduced, but like the ἴττω Ζεύς of
[illegible] in the [illegible] little [illegible]
[illegible] the [illegible] is left to
complete the picture. So the Doric forms
sprinkled through the chorus of the trag-
edy [illegible] the [illegible]
hint of the lyric, of which [illegible] the
[illegible]. Besides the [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
αὐτὸς καλῶς ἐξηγήσω (455a). He is the teacher

ing Socrates the pupil, a delusion which the latter encourages by his modesty (e.g. μαθεῖν, &c.). [illegible] (448 A)*, [illegible] his skill in taking inconvenient queries is seen in 448 D. As the Scholiast on 455 B says Δέδοικεν ὁ Γοργίας καὶ φεύγει τὴν διάλεξιν, αἰτιᾶται τοὺς παρόντας [illegible] ὡς οὐκ ἀνεχομένους. To this trickery we may compare his version of the famous bean puzzle**, as proposed to him by this same Chaerephon.

Perhaps the most apparent imitation of Gorgias' style [illegible] found in 452 E. Notice first the chiasmus of beginning and ending, πείθειν ... λόγοις and λέγειν καὶ πείθειν, recurring at the close to the theme of the little speech. Then the paronomasia of ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς κτλ and the allied figura etymologica in χρηματιστῇ ... χρηματιζόμενος, with

* cf. Philostratus, Vit. Soph. p. 492 K.
** cf. l. c. p. 493 K.

the emphasis of δέδωκεν, as of [illegible]), and the isokola of the sentence. The word, δοῦλον, with [illegible] Gorgias himself; for Protarchus (Phileb. 58A) has often heard his master claim that rhetoric πάντα ὑφ' αὑτῇ δοῦλα ποιοῖτο. This delicate epitome of style closes with a pathetic apostrophe, σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ.* Mark also the unnecessary fullness of expression and repetition of ἐν ξυλλόγῳ, ὅτῳ ξύλλογος and of ἄλλῳ καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοί. This professional padding is still more abundant in the longer speech (456A–457C), where indeed it is the chief peculiarity. The phrase οὐδὲ τοὺς διδάσκοντας μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων (b E) is later (457B, C) twice repeated almost word for word; so τῇ δὲ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ (b C) recurs in part in the next [illegible] (so οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ...).

*cp. [illegible]

οὐκ ἐξόντος (7A) is resumed just below by καὶ μὴ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ἐστι κατ' ἔτος (7A); ἐκεῖνοι παρέστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικάζειν χρῆναι (6B) appears slightly changed in 7E. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] μένους, μὴ ἐπιτρέχοντας (7A) shows the same tendency.- Besides these verbal repetitions, the thought, which one sentence would have expressed, is repeated positively and negatively with slight variations throughout the speech. Notice too the rhetorical and emphatic position of the adverb ἐξαίφνης at the beginning of the sentence (7A twice), of which [illegible] [illegible] examples, and to which Thucydides, Gorgias' pupil, is not averse*.- Antitheses are common, though inartistic, and are expressed by ἄλλος, ἀλλά, and οὔτε— οὔτε. This speech has its real

* v. Classen, Einleit. 79.

proem in 455 D E f.

This same fulness of expression is seen in occasional periphrases, of which his extant speeches afford examples*. So the participles [illegible] τῶν [illegible] (455 C), and [illegible] (455 B) exemplify a usage which another pupil, Isocrates, was later to bring any money into a character [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] wel (455 C), where they are perhaps necessary [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. However they are not uncommon periphrases, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] addition of καὶ δικαίως ἀπολαμβάνειν (457 E). — On the other hand, a careless form of brachylogy appears in ἐκ τῶν (for τῆς τῶν) [illegible] (455 C). We know from Aristotle's Rhetoric

*1. Blass, 65.

(189.20 Röm) that irony was a characteristic of Gorgias, though Aristotle refers it to the use of poetic ornament. Blass (63) cites the story of the swallow. In our dialogue [illegible] to Callicles, πάντως οὖν ἡ αὐτή ἡ τιμή (497 B) [illegible] The [illegible] tion would show irony quite as well, and it is doubtful if the dignified old gentleman [illegible] even though Protagoras and Hippias do use a few. The longest speech shows only a slight massing of participles. There are 13 [illegible] (456 B) ppp, (73 C) t p ttt, (C E) ppp. tt, (and E) pppp, t- [illegible]* [illegible] -ur particles, hence is epideictic, while the [illegible]

*Jahrbuch f. Philol. 103. 442

favorite oratorical combinations, and so is forensic. Here only two passages can fairly be called speeches in form. The former (452E), a declamatory glorification of rhetoric, has only the common particles καί, καίτοι, ἀλλά, μέν and δέ, so is epideictic, as its more artistic form and ornament [illegible] 457C), an endeavor to prove the power of the [illegible] 16 different particles and combinations of particles, hence is forensic. In the matter [illegible] (448A, 453E, [illegible]) [illegible] two sophists use.

[illegible] is very simple, and, owing to the use of his peculiar figures, is dual, antithetic and composed of short kola. Our dialogue shows but

little strong antithesis, and the duality is only apparent in a few places. The best cases are 452E, 456A-C, and 456 D E. οὐδέ γε — πόλεων. Often it is fairly simple, but a more complicated arrangement is seen in (457A) εἰ δὲ μέγα αὐτὸ σὲ ἐφαίνετο | χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύι | καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ | οὐκ ἐθέλουσι, where the second and third kola are parallel, and, less clearly, the first and [illegible] as in (452E) καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον — ἰατρόν, δοῦλον — παιδοτρίβην, ... δὲ — δοῦλος [illegible] each period the second and third kola are coordinate, but together are parallel to the first, so καὶ εἰ (457B). The only tricks of speech which are not used by master or pupil, are long compounds, bold metaphors, and [illegible] intended by the ἀπόστασις and πλοῦτος of

Philostratus. — Out of this, however, Callicles employs the bold metaphors and shows some asyndeton, while Socrates has one long compound, καταγελασματοποιεῖν (H', 2A), which may parody this trait of the sophist.

The whole delineation of Gorgias is marked by great moderation, and the aged Nestor (Phaedr. 261C) is treated with the utmost respect by Socrates. So it remains for his younger followers to show the exaggeration of his [illegible] principles and to receive the brunt of the attack. He is said, on reading this dialogue, to [illegible] [illegible] anything of the sort, to have exclaimed, ὡς καλῶς Πλάτων οἶδε ἰαμβίζειν (Athen. XI. 505), and to have styled him a νέος Ἀρχίλοχος. It has been thought* that Aristophanes parodies Gorgias

*Süvern, über Ar. Vögel, pp. 25–35, 47–55 (Av. 465–625, 1655. Vesp. 419).

in the Birds, while he attacked him indirectly through his pupil, Agathon, in the Thesmophoriazusae, but in neither case is the parody as apparent as here. Besides the famous travesty in the Symposium, the Menon, a sort of prelude to the great tragedy, Gorgias, is attacked through his pupil, who voices the ideas of his master*, and stands in his stead.

Polus.

This model pupil is far inferior to his master in depth of mind, and can not follow the course of dialectic, but must be repeatedly corrected and instructed. He disrespectfully pushes ahead of Gorgias, accuses Socrates of ill-breeding, and is altogether

*Meno 71D–72A, 82A – v. Taine p. 180; Schanz p. 120 f.

rough, impetuous, and arbitrary. This may be seen by such expressions as τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς (448A), ἀγροικία (461C), ἐπεὶ ἂν βούλωμαι (D). Impatience is shown by φάτι (462D twice) and καὶ ἀπόκριναι (463E) and conceit by ἄλλῃ τῇ γε οἰόμενος (471B).

The short speech 448C is an excellent example of exaggerated Gorgiasm. The paronomasia, homoioteleuton, isokolon, and still-lied figures are apparent to every one. The word αἰῶνα affords an instance of the poetic diction, with which Gorgias embell-[illegible] πορεύεται seems affected. The unusual position of the vocative at the head of the sentence may impart a certain dignity. [illegible] to open in Plato a longer and more formal speech. This piece is regarded by most

scholiast (after Schanz) as a verbatim extract from Polus' own τέχνη, since Socrates mentions (462 B) having read the term ἐμπειρία in that book, and since Hermogenes cites the first part, Aristotle the last, as Polus'. However, the allusion of Socrates is merely to the one word, and the citation of Hermogenes may be, as Sittl suggests, from this very place in [illegible]. [illegible] that only the first part [illegible] while the rest is in the idea, but not the form of Polus.* ~~[illegible]~~ The case is not so certain, then, as is generally considered, and it seems at least quite possible that the fine mimetic artist has here made as bold a parody of Gorgianic style as he did in the Symposium. The comment of Olymp., ὁ Πῶλος θεατρικῶς προάγει τὸν λόγον, seems to indicate that he [illegible]

* [illegible]

nature. As an epideictic speech, it shows poverty of particles. We may notice that Hirzel thinks γενναῖον (493D) may be an εἰκονολογία (Phaedr. 267C) from the above-mentioned τέχνη.

His interruption (46 ?C) presents the only case of decided anacoluth used by the three interlocutors,† who thus show their careful rhetorical training in marked contrast to the conversational familiarity of Socrates. Keck* would emend away this case, but it is clearly due to the excitement and impatience seen in the hyperbaton of ἄγειν... τοὺς λόγους and of μή in ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδώς. The alliteration ἀγαπῴης, αὐτὸς ἀγαγών seems almost too striking to be accidental. [illegible] followed his master in the study of [illegible] and a genealogy of the heroes.** To the word σχέτλια (46 ?B) and the phrase ἔτι καὶ πλέον

* [illegible] ** [illegible]
† see Note, p. 67.

(469 D; cf. B. 305) may be epic reminiscences.

The irony which Gorgias shows here so slightly, is very apparent with Polus (v. p. 23), and was only second to Socrates in its use.

A second characteristic speech is given 471 A-C, with its pompous prelude in 471 CD (cf. 455 D) which calls forth the comment of Olymp. ὑπὸ δικανικώτερον ἐκτίθεται. It is a good illustration of the [illegible] of the narrative, and its abundant and combined particles witness its forensic nature. The proem is A, the narrative proper B to the middle of C, and the epilogue the remainder. The speech opens with a rhetorical question (471 B), a common [illegible] which is avoided by the most earnest and effective orators. Indeed this figure, so abundant in the Palamedes of Gorgias, is such a pet weakness of Polus that he

introduces it twice in this attempted dialectic (466 A, C), and Socrates ridicules it by pretending to regard it as the opening of an oration (ἐρώτημα ἢ λόγου ἀρχή, l.c.). [illegible] [illegible] accumulated tortures in 473 B–C exemplify [illegible] [illegible] in laudando, vituperando a diligere was a specialty of Gorgias, and Olymp. (in 473 C) says, [illegible] [illegible] ἡλικιώτην (B) and of ἀδελφόν, υἱόν, παῖδα, (C), as δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (A), heaping one relation- [illegible] ation of Ἀλκέτης and the stem of δοῦλος (A), all very strongly emphasize the guilt of [illegible]

[illegible]
the name of the subject of the [illegible] arti-
-istically make the last word of the speech, [illegible]
name in the last sentence of their encomia.*
Finally the heaped-up participles denote the heaped-up guilt, though they mar the [illegible] of the speech.**
The ratio to finite verbs in the narrative is 12 to 5 [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
has the opposite ratio, 1 to 5, while the epilogue shows a more even balance.

[illegible]
[illegible]
and ταῦτα λέγεις [illegible]. The only points not pre-

* [illegible] 5, Lys. 26 — near the end. Lys. Dem. 22, Thuc. I.43, II.51, etc.
** [illegible] Journ. Philol. IX.146

[illegible]
λωβάς-λωβήσεις and the transition from ἄλλης to λωβάς. The first use of expression seen in Gorgias is found in the pleonasm ἤ τι, τούτου πρότερον (461 B). One of Gorgias' precepts was, εἰ ὁ ἐναντίος σπουδάζει λέγειν, γέλα καὶ ἔκκρουε αὐτόν (Olymp.), and Polus employs this device of his master (473 E).

Teichmüller* notes that Polus uses the answer πῶς γὰρ οὔ; five times in 475 B–478 C, and suggests that it may represent the Thessalian culture of Gorgias' school. Callicles uses it seven times, Gorgias three; Socrates has it twice, but it may be a mocking echo of the sophists. Moreover, it is twice employed by the imaginary objectors introduced by Socrates, who must be counted [illegible] [illegible] ties, the total is 1 2/3 to the page. In order to see

* Literarische Fehden, II. 321.

how far this form of answer is sophistic in its tendency, all the dialogues of Plato have been examined and the cognate forms πῶς δοκεῖ; and πῶς γὰρ ἄν; also noted. It does not appear in the Apol., Tim., Crit., Symp., Prot., Io, and Minex. — Socrates uses it once in the Euthd. and Crat., thrice in the Rep. and Gorg. twice. Four [illegible] The [illegible] (23; πῶς δοκεῖ; 14), Thrasymachus in the Rep. I. [illegible] in the [illegible] (12; [illegible]). [illegible] a disciple of Theodorus and he of Protagoras; the second (Phil. 58A) and third either pupils of, or strongly influenced by, Gorgias; while of the last we only know that he was one of the thirty. Three of these, then, [illegible]

[illegible] ap-
pearing in a dialogue of doubtful genuineness, renders testimony neither pro nor con. Though the Thessalian theory of Teichmüller finds no support, we infer that this answer is the [illegible] of the fine mimetic touches of our author. Lysis (16 9/13) and Alcibiades in Alcib. I. (20) have been excluded, the former dialogue being too short, the latter spurious.

Polus and Callicles.

These two pupils of Gorgias exhibit interesting differences and similarities of [illegible], and these are arranged in parallel columns for convenience of comparison. At their

entries each have the same idea in their mind, but

Polus rushes in, exciting and rough, [illegible] ἄττα λέγεις; (H 461 b) — (cf. p. 14 for asyndeton, etc.)

Callicles politely turns to [illegible] is cool and calm to Socrates — σπουδάζει Σωκράτης; and φαμεν σε σπουδάζοντα; (H 481 b, c)

Socrates [illegible]

[illegible] the little ceremony and bitter irony, accusing [illegible]

[illegible] a long speech, after Socrates had kindly explained his problem.

The same charge is made against Socrates: [illegible] ἀγροικία. (H 461 c)

[illegible] κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

The [illegible] of Participation.

Assumes the [illegible] dialectic, of which he

[illegible] speech, for which he is

[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]gnally.	a strong argument.
Starts his speech too	Begins with an in-
soon, and is checked	quiry, and introduces
by Socrates, before he	his speech at the prop-
[illegible]	[illegible]
of Socrates.	learned the views of Soc.

The right of the stronger is advocated.

in crude, revolting lan-	in specious terms, φύσις
guage — [illegible]	vs. νόμος, in poetic lang-
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
(343 B), and with the	with citations from
example of a coarse,	Pindar and Euripides.
barbarian tyrant.	

The answer of Socr. suits his opponent's style.

[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] replies.

[illegible]	[illegible]

(Polus) | [illegible]

the wrong verb, and Socr-ates answers, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε (470 D)

In citing Archelaus (470 D), says οὐδὲν—δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν—τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην—dwells on his misdeeds.

and has the right verb, perhaps profiting by [illegible]

In citing Xerxes (483 D E), remarks ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι λέγειν—quickly passes to the more distant Darius.

Irony.

οὗτος ἀνὴρ—indignant aposiopesis, but finally σχέτλια λέγεις—

οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν—οὐκ αἰσχύνει; (48?)

The answer of Socr. is meeker to Callicles.

οὐ κατηγορεῖ (46?, B).

εἶεν, ὦ ἡδύτατε (l.c.).

Socr. uses irony only [illegible] attacks personal weaknesses (461 B, 471 D)

Socr. uses the keenest, destructive irony, and [illegible] (as 490 C–E, 491 C–E).

(Polus)	(Callicles)

Both use a rhetorical question at the beginning

πῶς εἰ κἄδικος; (H/1A, cf. H/2B) — at the very start.	πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων; (H/1E) answers Socrates first.

Both treat Socrates with scorn,

παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν (H/1C).	ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ (H/1C), ὦ Σώκρατες (H/5E).

and show great confidence.

[illegible] (H/2) [illegible]	[illegible]
ἀ—πολλοῦ γε δεῖ (H/4B)	the general tone is firm.

The reductio ad absurdum is employed.

[illegible]	ἐλαττίω πλάττομεν [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]

Generally similar expressions or ideas

Socrates to Polus τηλικοῦ [illegible]	Callicles to Socr. τηλι[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
δοκεῖ σοι ὡς λέγω (H/1C).	καὶ γὰρ σύ (H/5B).
ἐλαφρόν τύραννος (H/3C).	[illegible]—δεσπότης (H/4A).

(Polus)	(Callicles)
ἄτοπα ἐπιχειρεῖν λέγειν (473A) (cf. 480E)	ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ (494D).

(Both show embarrassment.)

Socr. says twice τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει; [illegible] (474?) [illegible]	Socr. asks τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει (497?) after three unanswered queries.—

Socrates gives each two examples.

[illegible] from his own life (469?) (474A) — prosaic.—	to Callicles myths from the philosophers (493? –494A) — poetic.

Callicles.

As Gorgias upholds the theory of rhetoric and Polus its technique, so Callicles its practical application; or, as Jahn puts it, Gorgias is positive, Polus comparative, Callicles superlative. He is, as already shown, quite the most

[illegible]
[illegible]
exceeds in the length of his main speech
any [illegible]
[illegible] Symposium
and Republic. His independence of action
[illegible]
[illegible]),
his [illegible] (..., c, ...
99 b), his frequently restricted assent [illegible]
[illegible] to con-
tinue the discussion (5? 5 d). Olymp. compares
him to Sisyphus, who pushes forward the
[illegible]
added that it is the overpowering weight
of the Socratic elenchus, that compels
Callicles to retreat. He is clearly none of
[illegible] appears [illegible]
versary in the Platonic dialogues.

The rhetorical influence of Gorgias appears in the artistic assonance, ἐπαίνοος ἐπαινεθῆναι καὶ ψέγοος ψέγεσθαι (483 B), βελτίους τε καὶ [illegible] (?). [illegible] τε καὶ λόγοι καὶ ψόγοι (492 B), Ἐστω τοῦτο δὴ (504 A); in the vivid metaphors, [illegible] [illegible] (?), [illegible]τες (483 E), [illegible], ἐπεστομίσθη (482 E), πόρρω φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντες (486 A), and similes, ὥσπερ [illegible] (497 E); in the rhetorical questions (491 E, 2 B, C) and the alliteration, πείθοι, παρὰ τῶν [illegible]μάτων (486 C). Under this head may be classed the cases of hyperbole (μυρία 483 D), and catachresis (βίος 486 D). The sophistic criticism and adaptation of the poets is seen in quotations from Homer and Pindar, conspicuously from the rhetorical Euripides, selections from one of whose plays,

are skilfully woven into Callicles' own argument (485 E, 486 B C).

Though thus dependent on Gorgias, he is also a man of the world, and approaches to the epigrammatic style [illegible] [illegible] (λέγω, 484 B), careless repetition of [illegible] γελοῖον (485 C), his use of proverbs (447 A, 505 C, 514 B) and figura etymologica (8). Here also may be placed his exposition (466 C, 467 B). Though, as we have seen, (p. 7) a more artistic form might be ascribed to the contact with Gorgias. The massing of four (483 E) and the [illegible] the most finished part of his long speech, crowded as it is with poetic tropes and bitter scorn, reminds us of the exploits of his predecessors. At 458 C, Schol. O notes that Chaerephon desires the continuation of the dis-

[illegible] (Rep. [illegible] 201), but Callicles, because it is pleasant (ἡδύ ἐστι). So he says, ἐπιτιμεῖ Ζακύνθιος (447 B), but the latter answers βούλομαι (Chrm.).

The [illegible] knowledge of Callicles is limited to this dialogue and [illegible] [illegible] upon his [illegible]. That Plato has been considered not averse to the employment of pseudonyms [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] is the [illegible]* of Lysias with Dionysodorus, a character whose reality [illegible] had already doubted. Indeed Cicero (Leg. I. 15) thought that the [illegible] of the [illegible] Plato himself, and the Eleatic strangers are certainly shadowy characters in the Sophistes and Politicus. Steinhart and Stallbaum consider Callicles a typical Athenian of his time, and van Prinsterer treats

* [illegible] I. 444

[illegible]
doubts as to his real existence. Gotschlich held that he represents Isocrates, not in traits of character so much as in the expression of Isocrates' views, while he is forced to draw conclusions which the orator would not draw. However this is even more true of his relation to Gorgias, and he could only in a very general way represent two people. Schmelzer has a curious theory that the three interlocutors are the three accusers of Socrates, Gorgias being Lykon, Polus Meletus, and Callicles Anytus. He bases it chiefly on certain correspondences in the last pair, which he sets forth at the end of his Gorgias and in his Menon (pp. 50, 52, 58, 60). They are both wily politicians and easily angered, alike condemn the sophists and warn Socrates of his

fate, but Callicles is friendly, an aristocrat and cultured, while Anytus is hostile, low-born and ignorant. Moreover, Callicles calls the accuser of Socrates πάνυ μοχθηρὸς καὶ φαῦλος (521 c).

The most plausible view, which identifies him with Critias, was proposed by Cron in his Beiträge (1870), but he abandoned it in 1881*, apparently under the criticism of Bonitz. The similarity is, however, so very [illegible] Grote (I. 275) remarks, "had his name been Critias, instead of Callicles, his opinions would seem to reflect his life", and K.O. Müller, [illegible] these [illegible] together, making them with Thrasymachus a trio of sceptics. This collocation is as old as Themistius (Or. 26 fin.), and Olymp. often notices the connection with Thrasymachus. This even extends to language, such as

*Jahrbüch. f. Philol. 133.579.
[illegible]

pressions as κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις and ἡδὺς εἶ, beside πῶς γὰρ οὔ; above noted, being common to both, while they uphold the right of the stronger in like terms (483B, Rep. 338C). All three came under the instruction, or direct influence of Gorgias. To the striking points of likeness adduced by Cron, a few others may be added. Callicles is contradictory and changeable in his opinions (p. 14) and in his public life (481E), a character quite like that of Critias (Cron 19). The defense of πλεονεκτεῖν (Cron 17) is also seen in Xen. Hellen. (II. 3. 16), where Critias joins [illegible], as Callicles here (483D). In dialectic both change ground and withdraw their statements (Char. 164D, 165B), and object to Socrates' method of treatment, (Char. 165E, 166; Gorg. 497A, 511). Very little is known of Critias'

style, and only scanty fragments of his works remain. A certain similarity of idea is seen in the metaphor of Callicles, [illegible] ἐν τοῖς λόγοις . . . [illegible] (482 E), and the line, αἰδοῦς ἀχαλκεύτοισιν ἐζευγμένος πέδαις (fr. 14) from the Peirithous, which K. O. Müller and others ascribe to Critias. Callicles' approval of Cimon, Themistocles, Alcibiades was shared by Critias (Hist., Frag. 5). The fact that [illegible] (482 A), only occurs (until Plutarch) in Critias (Frag. 9 N.) and in 482 B, is probably a mere coincidence, unless Socrates intends it to be a compliment to the poet.

[illegible]

Olympiodorus devotes especial notice to the position and functions of Chaerephon. He says that he is ἑταῖρος, and is used by Socrates as an example of τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις γίνονται καὶ διαλέγονται, but is not essential to the discussion. He is, moreover, a medium between the two sides, διαπορθμεύει, and so, [illegible] rencontre with Gorgias (p. 3), he questions him in the place of Socrates (447 c). He [illegible] present, ἐγὼ καὶ ἰάσομαι (447 b), to [illegible] the preceding as Socrates [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] own phrase, οὐδὲν δεῖ [illegible] (447 c) into an answer to the host himself (448 b). So Socrates (p. 44) [illegible] the phrases of his opponents. In fact, as in Aristophanes' Clouds, he is the model Soc-

ratic pupil, and is the counterpart of Polus. He is more respectful to his master, and shows [illegible] [illegible] Gorgias ἐγώ (449 D). A touch of his master's irony appears in [illegible], he addresses both Gorgias and Socrates (458C), though the latter wished to continue the conversation. In his μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε... προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο (458C) he may have had in mind the line of Pindar, ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα, which was probably a favorite quotation of Socrates (cf. Phaedr. 227B). Here we may also note his figura [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] des, he justifies the epithet of μανικός, as [illegible]

him to do, and he occupies a like intermediate and introductory position.

Socrates.

I. His Personality.

In approaching the character of Socrates, we are at once confronted by the difficulty of distinguishing the peculiarities of the author in language and thought from those of his master. While Xenophon and Aristotle may help us to the extent of the [illegible], they leave us for the most part unaided in our study of the language. We might look to the Clouds of Aristophanes, but there the parody seems to be confined to method and doctrines. From [illegible] and works of

expression, which occur throughout the Socratic dialogues, and which agree with our knowledge of the character of Socrates. [illegible] considered dramatic reproductions of reality. The most prominent characteristic of these is the irony demanded by the special earnestness, plain-speaking and hair-splitting of the philosopher. To cite all the cases in the Gorgias would be to transcribe half the dialogue. It is sometimes quite apparent, often keen and cutting, [illegible] powerful engine of destructive criticism. Perhaps the most pungent examples are the [illegible] to this is litotes, which is well suited to the [illegible] of the philosopher. [illegible]

carries a positive meaning directly and clear-ly, [illegible]; its form at least seems more modest. It is most frequent in Xenophon and Plato, and this may be due to the influence of their common master. Four of the five cases of οὐ πάνυ are used by Socrates, as is also οὐκ ὀλίγης (+6103).

So playful and genial does he always seem that we are justified in considering peculiar to himself the occasional play upon words, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυρι-λάμπου (+116, [illegible]) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. This sportive fancy is exemplified also in pompous, legal expressions like Καλλικλῆς [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]

the use of [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] (451 B), and oxymoron, διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ (458 B). In this same familiar tone are used the proverbs. Dorian in their character and origin, as is seen by their frequency in Epicharmus and Sophron (Plato's models), and by the gnomic trend of Doric thought, they were approved and studied by Aristotle, but considered vulgar and old-fashioned by Isocrates. In Plato they are most abundant in the Lys. Charm. Euthd., Symp. and Phaedr., all dramatic and familiar in tone; then in the Theaet. and Phil., then in the Gorg. and Lach., the first three combining the serious with the dramatic, the last counter[illegible] [illegible] suppressed by a strong Doric color; and lastly in Euthро, Phaedo and Rep., where the elevation of tone somewhat overrides

dramatic tendencies. Out of 254 occurrences of 157 proverbs, 144 are put in the mouth of Socrates, 56 are used by his interlocutors, and 54 appear in Leg. Soph. and Polit., where he does not participate. In the Gorgias, Socrates employs 12, a number slightly above his ratio, and Chaerephon one; while the two sophists do not stoop at all to such vulgarity (v. p. 7). Callicles again shows his [illegible] by using three, slightly more than his share.

Another peculiarity of the Platonic style [?] is the figura etymologica, which Isocrates seems studiously to avoid. Dionysius (De Admir. vi 27), in his critique of the Menexenus accepts [?] the vulgarity of the figure, saying [illegible] πράττεται γὰρ τὰ πράγματα, ἐργάζεται δὲ τὰ ἔργα. Kühner* thinks that the more pleonastic forms

*Griech. Grammatik, 1056.2.

(as οἰκίαν οἰκοδομεῖν) have been taken into literary language from popular speech. In studying the use of this figure in Plato, we must recognize a "doubtful" class, consisting of the combination of a participle and verb (as ὁ ποιῶν ποιεῖ and ποιεῖν τὸ ποιούμενον) and the use with a neuter relative (as ποιεῖ ὃ ποιεῖ), which are deliberate and more exact forms of speech, and serve the needs of philosophic definition. The phrase [illegible] has been excluded, as being too common to give color. All kinds are found in the Gorgias, cases where the noun is in the nominative, accus., dat., and even [illegible] (456, 512C), and where the neuter takes the place of the noun. Socrates employs [illegible] %, excluding the "doubtful" class, [illegible] 4[illegible]%). This indicates that he owes his large proportion mainly to the use of definition and to

exactness of speech. Chaerephon has it twice, the sophists more sparingly (one each), and Callicles less than his ratio. In seven Socratic dialogues* ([illegible] pp.) the entire proportion is [illegible], without the doubtful, .37, of which Socrates has .47 and .26, while in four late dialogues** (320 pp.) it is .49 and .74. This inconveniently large proportion in the late dialogues is mainly due to the Laws, where the exact legal tone and a certain [illegible] out of the beginning may be responsible. Out of the dialogues examined, the largest proportion is in the Crito, then Leg. XI, then Gorgias. In the Symposium Socrates has 36% and 4% of the whole number, [illegible] opponents come with 18% and 14%. Here the philosopher only equals the sophists in the use of definitions. Its frequency in the [illegible] cases) seems to show that it was a favorite

* Prot. Lach. Euthd., Gorg. Crito, Rep. Meno.

** Soph. Polit. Crit. Leg. I-III, XI.

usage of Socrates, while the statistics from Plato indicate that the latter was even more [illegible] devoted to it than his master.

One of the most striking idiosyncracies of Socrates is his great fondness for oaths*. Two forms seem to have been his favorites; νὴ τὴν Ἥραν (414 D), which is properly a woman's oath, is found in Xenophon as well, and Professor Gildersleeve has suggested that he borrowed it from his mother, together with her maieutic art, of which Hera, through her daughter Eileithyia, was patron. It is also used by others.** The second, the famous Rhadamanthine νὴ (μὰ) τὸν κύνα (461 B, 466 C) is due to the euphemism, which goes a step further in the elliptic μὰ τὸν (466 E), and is explained (482 B) by the addition τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν. Beside the above, we have πρὸς Διός, φιλίου, [illegible] (458 D, 519 E).

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* v. Schanz, Novae comment. Plat. p. 15 ff.

** Xen. Conv. 3 f., Lach. 151 A, etc.

The frequent repetition of [illegible] bears witness to his lively and easy style. He cries out [illegible] (cf. 422B). [illegible] two-thirds of the [illegible] in the Euthydemus [illegible] by [illegible], by [illegible] the [illegible] of others [illegible] the same words. The skilful dia-lectician often repeats the phrases of his opponents in his own arguments, turning their sharpest weapons against his foes. ἐμπειρία (462B) from 448C, ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων (475D) from 471B, οὗτος ἀνήρ (506C) from [illegible] answers 466A-C, [illegible] answers 485E and 521A, καλλιεύεσθαι (527D) answers 482C, and ὁποῖον δοκῇ κτλ answers 466C ff. — With like εἰρωνεία (Sym. 215A) he ironically [illegible] their statements, [illegible] (480A and 485D), [illegible] (cf. 506B and [illegible])

— [illegible]

This is really a sort of parody in a parody, which is still more evident in the assonance of [illegible] (461 B), καλλι- [illegible] Πῶλε (461 [illegible]), [illegible] Πῶλε (461 [illegible]), [illegible] Πῶλε (461 B).

It has already been noted that in the language of all the three interlocutors there [illegible]. The speeches of Socrates on the contrary, [illegible] a very loose and careless style, which imitates the [illegible] of easy conversation. We know that the philosopher disregarded the mere externals of language and system, [illegible] himself (Symp. [illegible]) [illegible] [illegible]. This shows itself in loose, disjointed constructions like 455 D, [illegible], 505 [illegible]

[illegible]

516 B and in genuine anacoluths, 453 A B ἐγὼ . . . [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 517 D εἶναι . . . τοιοῦτον ὄντα, 521 A διακενῆσοντες 464 A;* also in the repetition of a word, as [illegible] [illegible], in [illegible] interruption (500 E), and in hyperbaton, [illegible] . . . γιγνομένῳ, 504 C), διαλέγεσθαι . . . πρὸς [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] ([illegible]), [illegible] [illegible] (505 A), [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 457 B τινι; also the awkward assonance, or cacophony, as [illegible] [illegible], ἐγὼ [illegible] [illegible], ἐγὼ λέγω [illegible] [illegible]

* See also Engelhardt. Anacoluth. Plat. I. 25-34.

(517 B), ἐγὼ ἄγω (474 E), τί δὲ τόδε; (474 D). — Pleonasm and polysyndeton are much rarer, as τούναντίον ἂν μέγα ἐλέγχοι (458 E), κρεῖττον — μᾶλλον (452 B), ἐπιεικείᾳ ἦν εἶναι (modesty) — and καὶ λιμένων κτλ. (517 A). Gathering from various indices 166 cases of anacoluth, in dialogues where Socrates participates, and 34 of brachylogy were found to have 54% of each. Of course these figures only show a general tendency since they do not present all the cases, nor do we know Socrates' exact ratio in the other dialogues. This same carelessness of speech may be noted in the Memorabilia, as ὀργίζεσθαι — λυπεῖ (III. 13. 1), II, 1. 15, δέονται — ἀγνοοῦσι (II. 3. 3), ἐνίοις ἀρκεῖ — ἀλλὰ περιποιοῦνται (IV. 2. 38).

The same work shows us that Socrates was accustomed to quote from the poets for illustration or support in his discussions. Hence there citations from Homer,

Hesiod, Theognis and Epicharmus, and he showed considerable familiarity with poetry. His friend Niceratus in the Convivium (IV.6, III.5) was a good Homeric scholar, and he was on intimate terms with the poet Agathon (ib. VIII.32). Accordingly we are not surprised to find him quoting in each dialogue from Homer, Simonides (? 457E), Epicharmus, and Euripides. His intimacy with the last named is well known.* We may also infer from Apol. 22B and Prot. 339 ff. that he was quite well versed in the poets, but it is doubtful that he was acquainted with all the twenty-one, from whom Plato makes him quote, and indeed, as it stands, his percentage (65) is not very high. Out of some 220 citations, or direct references, from the poets, Socrates has 145, of which about half (70) are from Homer.

In both Xenophon and Plato, Socrates uses

* Diog. Laert. II. 18, Cic. Tusc. IV. 29

many rare words, but it is probable that they are due chiefly to the authors themselves, as this is characteristic of their style and foreign to the simple nature of their master. One word, however, δικαιότης (508 A), as it only occurs elsewhere (here Dio Cassius) in Frgt. 33, 13 ([illegible]) and three times in Xenophon, may perhaps be Socratic. In the Gorgias, Socrates has 77.5% of the ἅπαξ λεγόμενα, only a trifle more than his share; Callicles and Gorgias are below their ratio, Polus above. Although Xenophon [illegible] phrases and [illegible] to the truth of Socrates, he was not enough of a dramatic artist to imitate so closely the usage of his master*, and, though they abound in the sayings quoted by Stobaeus, many of these citations are of doubtful authenticity. On the other hand, from their poetic nature and their [illegible] in

*Rep. 487 E (Adeimantus) σύ γε οὐκ εἴωθας δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν

the later dialogues, we may infer their rhetoric origin.* Similarly, the expression τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχειν (4, 52, 450 E), which occurs in the Memorabilia (I.2.54), and the metaphorical use of ὄψα and ὀψοποιία (464 D, 470 A, 500 E), which is found, not only in Xenophon (Mem. II.6, III.11.7 f.), but also in a dictum quoted by Stobaeus (Flor. I, 116), seem likely to have been favorite expressions.

There only remain a few figures, which do not seem Socratic, nor yet directly satirical, but rather borrowed from the very sophists whom he opposed. Cicero says (De Orat. I.11) "Plato in Gorgia, in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur", and Dionysius (ad Pomp. 2) χλευάζοντα τοὺς Γοργιείους ἵνα [illegible] and further [illegible] τοὺς περὶ Γοργίαν. For some of these sophistic figures, see [illegible], and on the whole subject of Platonic rhetoric,

*cf. Demetr. 251.3 Sp.

Γοργίας (pp. 447-527). In this dialogue we find the metaphors and similes previously mentioned, as κύρωμα ἀδικίας... [illegible] (450B, [illegible]), χρῆσθαι [illegible] κτλ. (456D), λόγῳ ἐπεξ- [illegible] and [illegible] ... καὶ τὰ μεγάλα (4[illegible]), ἀπεστέρηται and ἐπανόρθωσαι (461D), [illegible]... [illegible] (50[illegible]D), σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις..., λύσει (509A), καταχαλάσειεν [illegible] (512C), [illegible]... ἐξήκεστοι (5[illegible]), [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] (4[illegible]), [illegible] (4[illegible]), [illegible] (4[illegible]E), [illegible] (5[illegible]E), [illegible] τε [illegible] (518E); 493A-C are borrowed. Other comparisons come under the head of examples (p.). Add also the artistic assonance, φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα (508A); the [illegible] [illegible]... [illegible] (5[illegible]), ἡ [illegible] [illegible] (464E), [illegible]... ἄξει κεφαλῆς [illegible] (505D), ἡ [illegible] οὐ τελευτήσει [illegible] (51[illegible]), [illegible] [illegible] καὶ [illegible] (51[illegible]), ἡ [illegible]

λόγος (527 B), ὥσπερ ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ (527 E); and the alliteration, πλέον ἔχειν, πλεονεκτεῖν [illegible] γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέον ἔχειν (491 D), and [illegible], πικρότατα πόματα...πεινῆν. Perhaps also the frequent annominatio may be due to this influence. Though anaphora is very common in the Memorabilia it is unlikely a priori that it was really much used by Socrates. Here we find οὗτος and πολιτικός (510 C, 513 B). While chiasm is more or less natural to the Greek, some of the more striking forms which are encountered here, seem due to rhetorical training. (Cf. 467 E πλέον, 477 E [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], 500 E ὀψοποιία, 522 A ἰσχναίνων, [illegible].)

B. His Character.

If one feature of Socrates' character stands out in bolder relief than another, it is his modesty, real or assumed. He ironically professes to be entirely ignorant [illegible], — οὐκ οἶδα, ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω (453B), εἴ τι συνίημι (453A), οὐ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι (455B), οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω (451C), [illegible] (462D), [illegible] [illegible], οὐκ [illegible] [illegible] ἀγνοεῖν. Olymp. notes that in εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο (454A) Socrates [illegible] [illegible] and not to Gorgias, while in ἔλεγχέ καὶ ἐλέγχου (462A) [illegible] [illegible] κρίνου). In the same line is his naïveté, καί [illegible] [illegible] ism, ἢ ὅτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ (494E). His deep religious feeling, which is so manifest in the Apol.

Crito and Phaedo, appears throughout the closing myth. In the phrase παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον (523A) he reverently avoids allusion to the enmity of Zeus and Kronos, and he refers the guidance of his own life to God (512 E, cf. Apol. 41 D, Crito 54 E). Consequently he maintains his private judgment against all authority of man (472 A B, 488 A f., 526 D, cf. Apol. 29 C, Crito 44 C, etc.). That enmity to the democracy, which hastened his death, crops out in the references to his fate (p. ix), in his condemnation of the statesmen (515 B ff.), and in the parallel of the two pithoi (Gorg. 493 D ff.).

II. His Philosophy — A. Sources.

The discussion of the sources of Socrat-ic philosophy lies outside the province of this treatise. One class of writers, chief of whom are Hermann, Grote, and Ueberweg, prefers the testimony of Xeno-phon to that of Plato; while another, represented by Schleiermacher and Brandis, claims greater fidelity for Plato, but also makes use of Xenophon and Aristotle. This correct position Wyttenbach thus summarizes, "In Xenophonte imago Socra-tis; in Platone ipse Socrates". Fouillée and others aptly remark that Plato presents the ideal ([illegible]) Socrates, but Schleiermacher thinks that the philosopher is faithfully and artistically portrayed, but as the method and spirit of Socrates sway all the thought of his pupil, Plato puts in his mouth

what he believed to be the consequences of his teaching upon men and the Athenian city itself. This general agreement between the report of Xen. and Plato is remarkable. There is a description of the character and method of Socrates (Zeller, Vol. 2 p.) and Schanz mentions Prot., Lach., Meno, Char., Gorg. as the dialogues which most faithfully set forth his teachings. Most scholars would add the Apol. and Crito. The Prot. and Gorg. especially resemble the Memorabilia in the fuller and more independent answers given by the interlocutors, and even Hermann says that our dialogue exhibits "ganz Sokratische Dialektik."

B. The method of Socrates' dialectic presents two sides, — positive and negative. The latter shows, by means of critical examples, the change and contradiction of

opposing ideas and their consequent untruth. This so-called irony appears in in 457C-E and 474C-E, while 514DE gives the method of elenchus. Allusion is made to this treatment in the Memorabilia (I.4.1, IV.2.39). The positive side, maieutic, directs attention to the universal or [illegible] the real nature of things by means of induction and definition. The first step in induction is the example, which is generally drawn from the most ordinary spheres of action. So Callicles objects to its vulgarity, ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων (491A), and τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενά (497C), and Critias (Xen. Mem. I.2.37) says οἶμαι αὐτοὺς κατατετρῖφθαι διατεθρυλημένους ὑπὸ σοῦ (cf. Symp. 221E, Ar. Nub. 385 f.) Socrates himself (Xen. Oec. XIII.5) [illegible] the advantage of the method. In the Gorgias we have shoemakers (447C), weavers,

(447D), painters (453E), physicians (467C, 477E ff., 479A), [illegible] (452B, 477E, [illegible]), [illegible] boys (477E), poets, flute and lyre players (501E ff.), statesmen (503C, 515D ff.), pilots (511D), engineers (512BC), [illegible] (516A, cf. Xen. Mem. I.2.32); charioteers (516E), cooks (518B), and trainers of gymnastics (520C). Moreover, the choice of various public officials (455B) and the nature of sickness are adduced (496A). The inductive process naturally follows closely and applies these examples (cf. Xen. Mem. IV.6.15). It is illustrated most forcibly in the final [illegible] of the argument with Polus (474E, 476C-E, 478B), and in the clinching of the refutation of Callicles ([illegible] C-E, [illegible] D, [illegible]). Expressions like ([illegible]) [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible] 480A) indicate the consummation of the process. Often, though not always,

The result of induction is definition (Arist. Met. I.6, cf. XIII.4), which is necessary to the full and exact knowledge demanded by Socrates. First we find rhetoric defined (449E-453A) by Gorgias, then persuasion (453B-455B), then rhetoric again by Socrates (462C-466A). Power (466B), justice (472C?), punishment [illegible], and happiness have each its place, while the stronger and the better (488D, 489E), good and pleasure are carefully distinguished (495A, 500A). The words [illegible] and [illegible] ([illegible]) often point out this stage of the discussion.

Besides these fundamental principles, certain external devices are employed. (1) An imaginary objector, or questioner, is introduced, who usually represents the general public (cf. [illegible]).

In this dialogue [illegible] (457 E), εἴποι ἂν ὁ ἰατρός (452 A–C), νόμιμοι ὄντες ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι (452 D) mark the query and implied objection. This is more polite (and more forcible) than to make the criticism directly, and is therefore employed against Gorgias alone. (2) The speaker may quote the previous statements of his opponents, in order to be certain that they are rightly understood (cf. Rep. 334, 336, 337 A B, Xen. Mem. IV. 6. 14). The formulae employed are [illegible] (460 E), οὐκ [illegible] ἔλεγες; (460 E, 461 C), [illegible] (461 C), καὶ [illegible] τὸν λόγον (461 C), [illegible] (461 E), [illegible] (488 B, cf. 491 E). The requisites for discussion are three, ἐπιστήμη, εὔνοια, παρρησία (487 A, cf. Lach. [illegible] with 181 E), and the purpose of dialectic is the discovery of truth. Hence Socrates is ready ἐλέγχειν or ἐλέγχεσθαι, whichever will

attain this object, and this position he carefully states to each successive interlocutor (455 AB, 462 A, 506 AC; cf. Char. 166 E).

One feature of [illegible] dialectic, division, is denied to Socrates by [illegible], two reasons being Aristotle's reference of the process to [illegible], its [illegible] in the non-Socratic Sophistes and Politicus, and its close connection with the doctrine of ideas. [illegible], however, recognizes its germ in Socrates, while Fouillée holds that it is essential to definition, which is the result and union of induction and deduction, and cites the alphabetic classification of the Memorabilia (IV. 2. [illegible]). [illegible] inexact, and reached only probable results, since they [illegible] concrete class[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] improved and systematized the process [illegible]

concepts (εἶδη). However, even if the latter [illegible] be correct, such divisions as those of rhetoric (463 E ff.) and pleasure (499 E) seem too elaborate to have been made by Socrates. Such simpler forms as the two classes of persuasion (454 E) and the recognition of good, bad and indifferent (468 A ff.) might be ascribed to him more readily, and indeed the latter is more or less implied in the relative nature of good and evil (v. Mem. III. 8, IV. 2. 31-36).

6. [illegible] Doctrines.

This subject has been thoroughly treated by Brandis and Ribbing, and the [illegible] part of the Gorgias they both [illegible] attributed to Socrates. Upon examination of those portions of the dialogue not thus classified, the following are shown

by comparison with Xenophon and the earlier Socratic dialogues (cf. p. 56) to be the views of Socrates. (1) The identification of ἀγαθόν with ὠφέλιμον (468 C, 474 D; Mem. IV. 6. 8, Prot. 333 E), and with καλόν, and con[illegible] καλόν with [illegible] (474 D; Mem. III. 8.[illegible], IV. 8.[illegible], Lys. 216 D). (2) The community of interest is essential to friendship (507 E, 510 B: Mem. II. 6. 21-23, Plato often).
(3) The chief aim of the statesman must be the benefit of the state, not personal power (502 E-503 A, 515 [illegible], 517 C: Mem. III. [illegible]).
(4) The statesman must have previous training (514 B-E: Mem. III. [illegible], IV. 2. [illegible]).
(5) The good can suffer no harm (527 D; Apol. 41 D).
(6) Moderate eating is essential to health (518 D: Mem. III. 12. [illegible]. [illegible] (480 B-[illegible]), (8) The punishment [illegible] sought for guilty friends, but kept from guilty enemies, is merely an [illegible]

of the results of the preceding discussion, and though they are not directly compar-able with other views of the philosopher, it is quite in the Socratic spirit. While the precise distinction of κρεῖττον and βέλτιον is not found elsewhere, and Soc-rates seems to use them interchangea-bly in the Prot. (358C), the differentiation of γενέσθαι and εἶναι in the same dia-logue (340 BC); and Socrates' frequent claim to be the pupil of Prodicus (Mem. [illegible] II.1.21) make it not improbable that the distinction is his own. The discrim-ination of ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν (497A,D) and the difficulty of separating good and bad pleasures (500A) are implied in the Mem-orabilia (II 2.35,36; cf. [illegible]) Socrates emphasizes the great value of geometric balance of character, and of geometry in general (508A), but in the Memorabilia

(IV. 7. 2, 3) he condemns any careful study of the sciences. The depreciation of written testimony (Phaedr.) the statement of any opinion, and indeed the neglect of systematic knowledge is contrary both to the liberal Socratic spirit and to true philosophy. The pupil of such a Teacher would hardly write above his door, μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω.

The acquaintance of Socrates with the views and systems of previous philosophers is evinced by the summary which he makes in the Memorabilia (I. 1. 14). In the Gorgias he cites two Pythagorean comparisons (493, 494), which go back, ultimately at least, to the Pythagoreans (Philolaus). Even if they were taken from Empedocles (Cf. fr.) or Heracleitus (Schuster), it is probable that they merely borrowed them from the Pythagoreans, upon whom they were largely dependent in these

may be said of the theory of cosmic harmony ([illegible]), whose [illegible] suggests the [illegible] of the Sicilian. Pythagorean influences are more apparent in the later dialogues, and it is doubtful that Socrates made much use of this system. The quotation from Anaxagoras (Ap. 26) is quite consistent with Socrates' knowledge, for in the Memorabilia (IV, 7, 6) he criticises by name the views of that philosopher, and in the Phaedo (97) states that he had listened to the reading of one of his books. The Orphic myth agrees pre-eminently with the Orphic theology, of which Socrates could not have been wholly ignorant. The poetic colouring in philosophical nature, however, belongs to Plato, and the myth, as an integral part of his work, was one of his most characteristic creations. Xenophon and the earliest dialogues show no trace of its employment

by Socrates, and Plato, perhaps again under sophistic influence, first used it as an engine of philosophic thought (cf. Hirzel, 74; Dvořák 5 & 24).

Note to p. 114

Cron in his note on 483 D, ἐπεὶ ποίῳ — τοιαῦτα λέγειν, says, "das zusammenfassende ἢ tritt [illegible]" — this is really a rhetorical aposiopesis. Callicles impatiently cuts short the proposed arguments, "ποίῳ — ἐστράτευσεν," and "ὁ πατὴρ — Σκύθας," and leaves them both incomplete. This is lively, but artificial, like the question (ποίῳ) which is a [illegible] opening (cf. pp. 15, 24, 27).

[illegible]

[illegible]

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tion for college was received at the Friends'
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the Latin Satirists and Comedians. Since Octo-
[illegible]
Latin, and French at the Johns Hopkins Uni-
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for Greek in January, 1890, and a Fellowship
in the same subject in the following June.

[illegible]